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1. Introduction 
 
This paper proposes a Keynesian strategy for economic policy that aims to achieve higher, 
stable and sustained economic growth in Brazil. Its main hypothesis is that  the current poor growth 
performance of the Brazilian economy is due to macroeconomic and structural constraints rather than 
to the lack of microeconomic reforms (labour market, credit market, etc.), as liberal economists in 
Brazil have suggested.  
The paper is divided into four main sections, besides this introduction. The second section 
briefly discusses the main features of a new economic strategy (based on demand-side and supply-side 
policies) that aims to overcome the constraints on sustained economic growth. The third section 
discusses the current economic constraints for a sustained economic growth in Brazil. In the fourth 
section a simple of the Harrod-Domar growth model is utilized in order to obtain the potential growth 
rate of the Brazilian economy. Finally, the fifth section presents a new economic policy model for the 
Brazilian economy, designed to achieve the potential growth rate of the Brazilian economy. This policy 
should include both demand-side policies, and supply-side policies. 
 
2. Keynesian economic policies: a brief view 
2.1 Definition of Keynesian economic policy 
 
Contrary to orthodox economics, for which activist economic policies have no permanent effect 
on the real variables, such as employment and product, Keynesian policies, in a broader sense, have as 
main objective the achievement of full employment. In this connection, the meaning of Keynesian 
policy that we will adopt in this paper is that in which “policy implications arise from the perception of 
the role of aggregate demand in setting the level of economic activity and the lack of automatic forces 
leading a market economy to full employment” (Arestis and Sawyer, 1998, p. 181). According to this 
view, a laissez-faire market economy exhibits normally elements of instability and, importantly, does 
not create a level of aggregate demand consistent with full employment. As a result, in monetary 
economies, full employment can only be achieved by accident or through state policies. 
Indeed, the concept of monetary economy
1 or entrepreneurial economy results in the possibility 
of effective demand failures as non-producible money can dominate labour-using capital as a means to 
                                                 
* Federal University of Paraná and CNPq. Email: joreiro@.ufpr.br. Web-page: www.joseluisoreiro.ecn.br.  
** University of the State of Rio de Janeiro and CNPq. Email: luizfpaula@terra.com.br.  
*** The authors would like to thank Geoff Harcourt, Phillip Arestis and other participants of the congress “Understanding 
Economic Growth: New Directions in Theory and Policy” for their helpful comments. Financial support of CNPq and 
Fundação Araucária is gratefully acknowledge.    1
accumulate wealth. Under radical uncertainty, to hold money or other liquid assets is a rational act, 
since money provides flexibility to the agents in their portfolio composition, due to its attribute of 
being maximum liquidity. In general, it is highly value when uncertainty increases. Money is not 
neutral in the long period precisely because it is a form of wealth that, as an asset, competes with other 
assets, affecting the accumulation path of the economy, and thus the determinants of its actual long 
term performance. Indeed, the accumulation of monetary wealth define the productive accumulation of 
an economy as investment decisions and holding monetary wealth are excluding decisions: the 
production of capital goods depends on the stimulus that the investors have to shift liquid wealth for 
iliquid wealth, that is it depends of their liquidity preference
2. 
Based on the concept of non-neutrality of money and in the principle of effective demand, 
economic policy – according to the Post Keynesian approach – is able to affect both in the short- and 
long-run the real variables of the economy. Keynesian policy is related to the implementation of 
economic policies that intend to increase aggregate demand in order to create a stable environment that 
stimulate entrepreneurs to make new investments. Indeed, employment level and the utilization of 
productive capacity depend crucially on the determinants of aggregate demand, particularly the 
entrepreneurs’ investment decisions. In other words, economic policy should affect aggregate private 
investment, as it can create a safe environment that stimulate private agents to make more risky choices 
– that render profits and generate employment – than just accumulating liquid assets. So, the ‘good’ 
policy is that in which economic agents are stimulated to invest in capital assets (new investments). 
The sphere of action of the government should not however overlap with the private sphere; indeed, it 
should help to create a stable and safe environment for private agents to act
3. 
One should note that the objective of the economic policy in this approach is related to 
macroeconomic stability, a broader concept than just price stabilization, as it aims to reduce the 
uncertainties that are intrinsic to the business world. Government can reduce macroeconomic risks that 
affect the economy as a whole. Price stability and higher level of product and employment can be, 
under certain conditions, compatible; for this purpose, government should make use of a broader tool 
of economic policy than just monetary policy. In order to reach multiple policy objectives – such as 
economic growth and price stabilization – it is necessary to have a greater co-ordination of 
macroeconomic policies (fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, and income policies). Government should 
evaluate the global impacts of the policies on their objectives as a whole, that is Keynesian policies 
consist of concerted actions in a multiplicity of arenas. In this context, policy co-ordination is essential 






                                                                                                                                                                        
1 According to Keynes (1973, p. 55), a monetary economy is defined as that in which “money plays a part of its own and 
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2.2. Constraints on economic growth
4 
 
There are many constraints, both from demand-side and from the supply-side, on the 
achievement of sustained economic growth. This objective on a long-term basis requires that those 
constraints are somehow sufficiently eased. 
 
Aggregate demand constraint 
As we have already stressed, a laissez-faire market economy does not create a level of aggregate 
demand consistent with full employment. According to effective demand principle, the level of output 
and employment in an economy is determined primarily by the demand for goods. Low economic 
growth and high unemployment results from the lack of effective demand; such demand is determined 
by entrepreneurs’ expectations on future demand, as they decide each period of production what they 
are going to produce and how many they are going to employ. In other words, the volume of 
expenditure determines the aggregate demand of an economy, while the level of employment depends 
on the agents’ expected expenditure
5. In sum, according to the Post Keynesian approach there is a lack 
of automatic forces within a market economy working to ensure that the level of aggregate demand is 
compatible with the full employment of labour and the existing capital stock. 
 
Inflation constraint 
Inflationary pressures usually emanate from the real side of the economy. Indeed, the process of 
moving towards sustained economic growth always involves falling unemployment and most of time 
rising capacity utilisation which are likely to generate inflationary pressures and a climate of 
inflationary expectations. As Davidson (1994, p. 145) points out “ever significant expansion in 
economic activity will induce some price increases because of diminishing returns [due to the scarcity 
of some input such as raw materials or managerial talent]. With rising prices and stronger employment 
opportunities, workers will try to seek, at a minimum, cost-of-living wage increases. As pools of 
unemployment dry up, workers can become more impenitent in their wage demands. Managers are 
more willing to grant wage increases in a rising market”. The spread of inflation pressures depends on 
the degree of monopoly of firms, that can allow them to increase the mark-up of prices relative to costs, 
and the degree of workers organization, as every increase in money-wage rates not offset by 
productivity improvements raises production costs. Particularly, if unemployment rates shrink a great 
deal, it is easier for workers obtain more liberal wage increases.   
Post Keynesian view criticises the use of Monetarist ‘tight money’ anti-inflation policy as it 
attacks the symptom but not the cause of the inflation. Any inflation pressures that occur in a situation 
that an economy is below the level of full employment have its cause in the supply side. Orthodox anti-
inflation policies are oriented towards maintaining a sufficiently high unemployment rate to constrain 
inflationary wage demand of workers and profit margin increases of firms. That is, it can be only 
successful if it perpetuates significant unemployment.  
Post Keynesian economists support that inflation is symptom of a fight over the distribution of 
current income, as it is the result of attempts of alter the existing distribution of money income among 
economic agents of the same region, and/or interregionally, and/or internationally.  In the Post 
Keynesian view, there are many and different causes for inflation, and, consequently, there are various 
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types of inflation; for each type of inflation a specific anti-inflationary tool should be used.  For 
instance, spot or commodity price inflation, that occurs whenever there is a sudden and unforeseen 
change in demand or available supply for immediate delivery, can be avoided “if there is some 
institution that is not motivated by self-interest but which will maintain a ‘buffer stock’ to prevent 
unforeseen changes from inducing wild spot price movements. A buffer stock is nothing more than 
some commodity shelf inventory that can be moved into and out of the spot market to buffer the market 
from disruptions of offsetting the unforeseen changes in spot demand and supply” (Davidson, 1994, p. 
158). 
 
Balance of trade constraint 
The balance of trade constraint arises when the level of economic activity is constrained to 
ensure that the level of imports is compatible with the level of exports, as any difference between 
imports and exports should be covered by borrowing from overseas, what in the long run can increase 
the external vulnerability of an economy
6. 
Developing countries, particularly, can face a structural problem in their balance of payments, 
due to the effect of what is known as Thirwall’s law
7.  This law states a link between rate of economic 
growth and the income-elasticity of imports and exports of an economy; it states that the in the long run 
demand-side variables play a key role in economic growth through the ‘balance of trade constraint’: a 
country cannot grow at a rate higher than what is consistent with its balance of trade equilibrium. The 
low income-elasticity of products of smaller aggregate value exported by developing countries vis-à-vis 
the greater income-elasticity of products imported from developed countries can generate structural 
deficits in the balance of payments of the former countries. These increasing deficits can result in a 
significant constraint for economic growth in developing countries, as the maintenance of a non-
exploding deficit requires that the domestic growth rate is maintained below the world growth rate so 
that imports and exports grow in line with one another. 
 
Capital account constraint 
The capital account constraint arises when an economy is vulnerable to the changes in the 
liquidity conditions and/or changes in the mood of global players in the international financial market, 
whatever maybe the reason. Indeed, as the experiences of 1990s’ currency crises showed all around the 
world, under a context of high capital mobility, such crises can occur for reasons not related directly to 
deficits in the current account’s balance of payment.  In other words, economies with small if any 
current account deficit (over GDP) – a situation in which a country is seen as solvent from the balance 
of payments’ point of view – can face a sudden stop in the capital inflows due to a shift in the 
international investors’ expectations. Sunspots
8, herding behaviour or contagion effect can induce this 
shift. 
Countries with (i) much larger and volatile capital flows in relation to the size of their domestic 
capital markets and economies; (ii) non-convertible currency; (iii) low level of international reserves, 
are generally more prone to face capital account constraint. In such countries volatile capital flows can 
generate very high volatility on exchange rates. Indeed, there are various economic issues related to 
excessive volatility of exchange rate, particularly related to the management of exchange rate risk and 
macroeconomic policy (determination of interest rate and public debt).  
                                                 
6 Paula and Alves, Jr (2000, p. 597), using Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis approach, state that  “external financial 
fragility may be defined as the degree to which an economy is vulnerable to changes in conditions of financing originating 
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7 See, among other references, Thirwall (2002). 
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Lack of capacity 
Lack of capacity can constrain economic growth in the long run in two scenarios. During the 
upturn, high economic growth can fulfil full productive capacity of an economy, a phenomenon that 
can results in inflation pressures, as we have already stressed. On the other hand, after a period of 
prolonged low growth the size of the capital stock may fall short of what would be required to sustain 
economic growth, due to the uncertainty about the future, generating a low level of ‘animal spirits’ that 
affects entrepreneurs’ investment decisions.  Under these conditions, entrepreneurs’ expectations 
should be stimulated in their decisions related to fixed investments by demand-side economic policies. 
 
2.3. Keynesian economic policies 
 
Post Keynesian policies in order to overcome the constraints on full employment put emphasis 
on the need of both demand-side and supply-side policies. However, aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply are not independent, as the current level of demand has direct effect on the future supply 
potential of the economy; that is in both investment and productive capacity.  
Fiscal policy can have a strong impact on the level of economic activity, as it is a powerful tool 
to stimulate aggregate demand, triggering a multiplier effect on the private income. Fiscal policy 
should be used to push the economy toward full employment, as it affects directly the private income, 
and the agents’ expectations concerning the future, igniting their optimist. For this purpose, Keynes 
recommended public expenditure or investment rather than on increasing consumption, because of its 
stronger multiplier effect. Public investment can create a safe environment that can stimulate 
investment on fixed capital be undertook.  
Using as a starting point the distinction made by Keynes (1980) between ordinary budget 
(related to ordinary functions of public administration) and capital budget, the former should be 
balanced all times or even in surplus (that would be transferred to capital budget), while the latter one 
could be transitory unbalanced, although it should be balanced over the long run; that is it should be 
adjusted according to the fluctuations of the level of aggregate demand. In other words, capital budget 
must be operated in a contra-cyclical way, preventing high fluctuations in the private investments 
through the implementation of a long-term fiscal stabilization programme. The pace of public 
investments should be set according to the need of sustaining aggregate demand, serving to offset 
exogenous cyclical changes in investment spending. As Kregel (1994-95, p. 265-6) states: “Looked 
over time, both the ordinary and capital account should be roughly in balance; when demand declined, 
capital expenditures would increase and create a temporary deficit that would be eliminated as the 
capital projects paid off in terms of higher tax receipts and surpluses on the ordinary budget”. 
There are, however, some limits on policy fiscal caused by the operation of financial system: (i) 
interest rates (particularly on bonds) may raise with a budget deficit – as they increase the financial 
burden of the public debt - thereby limiting the government’s ability to borrow; (ii) adverse reactions 
by the foreign exchange markets to particular policies – as ‘bubble, fad and herd behaviour’ often 
determine movements in prices (interest rates and exchange rates) – can lead to a fall in the value of the 
currency
9 (Arestis and Sawyer, 1998, p. 188). 
Monetary policy operated by the management of the interest rate can also have a significant 
impact on the level of economic activity. The management of interest rate can be used in order to 
influence the private agents’ portfolio in favour of both increases of production (using current 
productive capacity) and the acquisition of capital goods. The managing of monetary policy can be 
used to provoke a shift in the relative prices of different assets, from the more liquid to the more iliquid 
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assets, that is leading changes in the portfolio decisions that can affect real variables of the economy 
(product and employment). Monetary policy acts through the anticipation of expected movements of 
the rates of interest. As Carvalho (1997, p. 45) states, “People are supposed to form a view as to what is 
the normal rate of interest and to expect that actual rates gravitate around that level. Those that judge 
the actual rate to be higher than the normal rate, take measures to anticipate a future reduction of the 
interest rate, and conversely.” 
Monetary policy should give clear signal of central bank purposes for the private agents in order 
to incite them to act according to the objectives of the policy-makers. More clear policy signals can 
leave private agents more safe and confident to act. Contrary to what became accepted by orthodox 
economists, Keynes and Post Keynesian economists defend openness, not secrecy, as a condition for 
monetary policy to be effective
10.  For this purpose, “a monetary policy is required which ensures 
stability to the financial system and pitches interest rates as low as possible (bearing in mind 
international constraints) for this may give some (possibly slight) stimulus to demand but also relieves 
the constraint (…) on the use of budget deficits” (Arestis and Sawyer, 1998, p. 189). So, monetary 
policy has an important stabilizing function in the economy, as it can signal for the private agents that 
central bank will adopt interest rate low enough to stimulate productive investment and at the same 
time will seek to stabilize volatility of interest rate in the short run, since frequent oscillation in interest 
rate affect negatively entrepreneurs’ expectations in terms of their investment decisions. 
In global financial markets, financial market prices – including exchange rate – have been 
excessively volatile, as they fluctuate according to fads and fashions
11. Indeed, there is an extensive 
literature which indicates that the excessive volatility in exchange rates affect negatively some real 
variables, such as investment and output
12. Aiming at achieving a stabilizing economic policy for 
sustained economic growth, national government should adopt an exchange rate policy that aim to 
prevent excessive volatility in exchange rates. The greater degree of stability of exchange rates would 
encourage entrepreneurs to engage more freely in international production, investment and trading 
transactions. This suggests an adjustable peg system with arrangements to avoid high volatility in 
exchange rate, such as accumulation of foreign reserves so that central bank can make use of dirty 
float, the use of capital controls by some developing countries, etc. Indeed, the success of maintaining 
an adjustable peg system requires that “the public be convinced that the central bank that actively 
intervenes in the market has adequate international reserve assets to ‘make’ the market price. If the 
reserve holdings of the intervening bank are perceived as being inadequate, then the market sees that 
selling the currency that is being defended is a ‘one-way’ bet to success” (Davidson, 2002, 170). 
Furthermore, institutional and regulations – such as some sort of capital controls, financial supervision, 
etc – can be required to ensure that the fragility of the financial system does not spill over into 
instability within the productive economy.  
Supply side policies have to deal with two sorts of issues: problem of inflation, unbalance in 
overseas current account, and organisation of work
13.  
As we have already stressed, orthodox stabilization policy is only efficient towards the 
maintenance of a sufficiently high unemployment rate; furthermore, in most cases,  it attacks the 
symptom but not the cause of the inflation, that is such policy does not solve the problem related to the 
                                                 
10 According to Carvalho (1997, p. 46), “A monetary economy could settle down on any one of many possible equilibrium 
states. Authorities should signal to agents which position was targeted”. 
11 Keynes (1964, ch 12) showed in his General Theory that investor and speculator expectations are governed not by real 
fundamental in the long run related to a prospective yield of an investment over a long term of years, but by how much the 
market will currently value the asset, in an effort to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation in a few months’ time. So, 
as speculators dominate financial markets, short-run practices provide the rhythm of assets prices. See, also, in this regard,  
Alves Jr et al (1999/2000). 
12 See, for instance, Guérin and Lachrèche-Révil (2003). 
13 We refer again to Arestis and Sawyer (1998, pp. 190-1).   6
increase of production costs. Therefore, Post Keynesians suggest some kind of incomes policy as part 
of the required arsenal in a market economy. Incomes policy requires however the generation of some 
sort of consensus over the distribution of income among the economic agents (government, 
entrepreneurs and workers). If money-wage rates and gross margins could be somehow controlled, 
price levels would decline. For this purpose some degree of centralisation and of coordination of pay 
setting would be required. Furthermore, the success of an economic policy oriented towards the 
objectives of macroeconomic stabilisation, as we have defined above, can also contribute for the price 
stabilisation purposes. For instance, if economic policy succeed in reducing the volatility of exchange 
rate and interest rate, the more stable macroeconomic environment will have positive effect on both 
economic growth (as investment decisions are stimulated by business environment and macroeconomic 
policy) and price stabilisation. 
The requirement for a broad balance on the overseas current account at full employment implies 
to overcome somehow the structural problems of balance of payments that some countries face (mainly 
those that are producers of commodities) as increasing deficits can result in a significant constraint to 
economic growth, according to Thirwall’s law. To overcome the balance of trade constraint public 
policies (mainly industrial policy) should be adopted in order to create conditions for a country to 
decrease the income-elasticity of demand for imports and to increase income-elasticity of demand for 
exports. These efforts should mean the development of an ability to compete in a range of high 
technology and/or the technological improvement of some current industrial sectors, what should 
involve both investment in research and development and the formation of linkages between companies 
to develop the whole production system
14. 
 
3. Constraints for economic growth in Brazil 
 
The period following implementation of the stabilisation plan known as the Real Plan – that is, 
from July 1994 onwards – was striking for a remarkable reduction in inflation, even after the major 
devaluation of January 1999. After two years of economic growth (1994-95) resulting from the initial 
effects of this stabilisation plan based on an exchange rate anchor, GDP evolution disappointed 
previous expectations of sustainable economic growth after price stabilisation. Furthermore, the trend 
took a ‘stop-go’ pattern
15 and, as a result, formal unemployment rate has been maintained above 10 
percent since 1997 (Table 1). 
In fact, the Brazilian economy has suffered the impact of a succession of crises: Mexico in 1995, 
Asian countries in 1997, Russia in 1998, its own crisis in late 1998 and early 1999
16 and, more recently, 
crises in Argentina since late 2001 and again external crises in Brazil in 2002-03. A wide range of factors 
have contributed to shaping a very unstable macroeconomic context: the perception of external vulnerability 
deriving from both the still worrying levels of external indicators – although these indicators improved a 
great deal in 2004 due to the increase of exports and GDP – and the liberalisation of capital account
17; semi-
stagnation  in the economy, that has inhibited productive investments; the central bank’s adoption of very 
high short-term interest rates and the consequent growth in public debt (see Table 1 and 2). Brazil’s current 
macroeconomic constraints stem mainly from the period when an exchange rate anchor was adopted (1994-
1999) in a context of trade and capital account liberalisation  that generated  a notable degree of external 
                                                 
14 As Stiglitz (1999, p. 113) states: “for most countries not at the technological frontier, the returns associated with 
facilitating the transfer of technology are much higher than the returns from undertaking original research and development. 
Policies to facilitate the transfer of technology are thus one of the keys of development”. 
15 Economic growth in 2004 is due mainly to the sharp increase in the trade balance in consequence of the rise in both 
demand and prices of commodities in the international trade as US and China grow a great deal. However, preliminary 2005 
data show a decline in the economic growth possibly due to the increase in the interest rate. 
16 See Paula and Alves, Jr (2000) and Saad-Filho and Morais (2002) for an analysis of the 1998-1999 Brazilian currency 
crisis. 
17 Although capital account has been gradually liberalized since early 1990s, more recently it has been more eased.    7
fragility of the economy and consequently some serious macroeconomic imbalances (for instance, high 
foreign debt, rapidly growing internal public debt, and so on).  Private sector expectations have dropped 
under the impacts of various external shocks, the weak performance of the Brazilian economy, and the very 
high rates of interest. As a result rate of investment has been reached levels (around 18-21% of GDP since 
early 1990s) far below the 1970s ones when investment rate was around 21-23%. 
 
Table 1. Brazil - some macroeconomic data - 1991/2004     
Year 
General 










of GDP)  
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US$ million 
Current account 









(1985 = 100) 
Formal 
unemployment 
rate* - Sao 
Paulo urban 
region (%) 
1991  496.71  1.03  18.11           10,580             -1,408  38.1  58.5  6.7 
1992  1167.17  -0.54  18.42           15,239               6,109   37.1  61.3  8.0 
1993  2851.34  4.92  19.28           13,299                -676  32.6  68.4  7.6 
1994  908.01  5.85  20.75           10,467             -1,811  30.0  65.9  7.8 
1995  15.02  4.22  20.54            -3,466          -18,384  30.6  69.9  8.7 
1996  9.22  2.66  19.26            -5,599          -23,502  33.3  71.5  9.2 
1997  7.11  3.27  19.86            -6,753          -30,452  34.4  72.4  10.2 
1998  1.84  0.13  19.69            -6,575          -33,416  41.7  71.5  10.8 
1999  19.91  0.79  18.90            -1,199          -25,335  48.7  65.9  10.5 
2000  9.52  4.36  19.29               -698          -24,225  48.8  62.3  10.0 
2001  10.23  1.31  19.47              2,651           -23,215  52.6  56.9  11.6 
2002  27.66  1.93  18.32           13,121             -7,637  55.5  51.6  11.4 
2003  6.95  0.54  17.78           24,794               4,177   57.2  53.5  12.0 
2004  11.87  5.18  19.58           33,693            11,669   51.8  52.3  10,0 
Source:IPEADATA              
Note: (*) Formal unemployment rate does not include informal unemployment    
 





























1995  45.0 22.0 22.0 34.0  3.0  3.0 -2.61 
1996  55.0 25.0 22.0 35.0  4.0  2.0 -3.03 
1997  73.0 24.0 24.0 27.0  4.0  1.0 -3.77 
1998  87.0 28.0 28.0 20.0  4.0  1.0 -4.24 
1999  126.5  33.7 42.0 16.1  4.7  0.6 -4.72 
2000  88.6 29.0 36.0 15.2  3.9  0.7 -4.02 
2001  84.9 28.0 41.2 17.1  3.6  0.7 -4.55 
2002  82.7 23.6 45.9 18.0  3.5  0.8 -1.66 
2003  72.5 19.4 42.4 22.9  2.9  0.9  0.82 
2004  53.8 14.8 33.4 26.3  2.1  1.0  1.94 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil           
 
The 1999 switch from an exchange anchor to a floating exchange rate regime plus an inflation target 
regime brought no significant improvement in the macroeconomic variables (see figures in Table 1), 
although balance of payments have improved their accounts in 2003-04 due mainly to the increase in 
the trade balance surplus. One might have expected that adopting a floating exchange regime would 
ease down the interest rate more quickly in Brazil. Although the rate of interest did decline – after a 
period when the overnight rate was hiked sky-high (to more than 40% p.a.) under the effect of the   8
Asian crisis until the devaluation of the real in January 1999 – it picked up again during 2001, in view 
of the turbulence on international markets (the Argentina crisis, the effects of 11 September 2001, etc.), 
and again in 2003 due to the market turbulence in the beginning of Lula da Silva’s government.   
Indeed, the modus operandi of inflation targeting regime plus the adoption of a floating exchange rate 
regime, under the conditions of high external debt and full opening of capital account, has resulted in 
sharp instability of nominal exchange rate (Figure 2 and 4). Capital outflows can induce a sharp 
exchange rate devaluation
18 that can affect domestic prices (‘pass through effect’) that can jeopardize 
Central Bank’s inflation target. Under these conditions, Central Bank is compelled to increase the 
interest rate in order to seek to avoid both capital outflow and pass through effect as it affects the 
aggregate demand. Central Bank reaction to exchange rate movements causes a decline in output and 
employment, increasing at the same time the volume of public debt. 
 
 
Macroeconomic framework of developing countries with high external indebtedness 
 
Therefore, Brazil’s very high rates of interest are the result of high country risk
19 (due to marked 
external vulnerability and the risk of fiscal insolvency) and of adopting an inflation-targeted regime in 
a context of various macroeconomic constraints and a high level of internal debt. High interest rates 
have had two effects: (i) they constrained economic growth, through the price of credit (loan rates) and 
entrepreneurs’ negative expectations; and (ii) they increased public debt, which is formed mainly by 
indexed bonds or short-term pre-fixed bonds. Indeed, the strong demand for hedges against exchange 
devaluation and interest rate changes in turbulent periods has influenced Brazil’s internal public debt. 
The Brazilian government has been obliged to offer exchange rate and interest rate hedges to buyers of 
securities who charge high risk premiums to roll over public debt. As a result, since the end of 1998, 
more than 50% of the federal domestic securities have been indexed to the overnight rate, while more 
                                                 
18 One should note that while exchange rate volatility was very reduced until end-1998 when Brazil adopted a crawling-peg 
exchange rate regime, after the adoption of flexible exchange rate regime exchange rate volatility increased a great deal 
(Figure 4). 
19 Bresser-Pereira and Nakano (2002) suggest that the causality between interest rate and country-risk may be inverse: since 
short-term interest rates have been very high, foreign creditors believe that country-risk is high. According to the authors, 
the rate of interest is high in Brazil because it serves multiple functions: to achieve inflation targets, to limit exchange 
devaluation, to attract foreign capital, to roll over public debt, and to reduce trade deficits by curbing domestic demand. See, 
also, in this connection, Oreiro (2002). 
High external 
debt 
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than 20% have been indexed to foreign exchange.. In addition, the ratio net public debt to GDP rose 
from 34.4% in December 1997 to 53.5% in December 2003; in 2004 this ratio declines due to both 
economic growth and exchange rate appreciation (Table 1). 
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Source: IPEADATA and Central Bank of Brazil. Figure 4: authors’ calculations.  10
 
The behaviour of the domestic public debt in Brazil has proved particularly vulnerable to changes in 
the interest or exchange rates. Reducing the public debt depends on reducing the related financial 
burden by bringing down the interest rate or raising the exchange rate, and/or boosting the primary 
fiscal surplus. Thus, the Brazilian government has been forced to generate a high primary fiscal surplus 
(more than 3.5% of GDP), which stands in the way of any anti-cyclical fiscal policy while the fiscal 
effort itself is partly neutralised by increases in the rates of interest or exchange
20.  
Another reason why economic growth in Brazil has remained above its potential growth is that credit 
has declined since beginning of 1995 (Figure 8). One of the main factors preventing increased credit in 
Brazil  lies in the very  large banking spreads
21 (Figure 7), which explain, at least partly, the high 
profitability of the banking sector in Brazil (Paula and Alves, Jr, 2003). Although the banking spread 
has declined in recent years in Brazil, it is still very substantial by international standards: in 2000, 
annual banking spread was 38.72% in Brazil, while it was 11.96% in Mexico, 2.75% in Argentina, 
5.64% in Chile, 2.77% in the U.S., and 3.15% in Euro area (Afanasieff et al 2001, Table 7, p. 7). 
 
4. Requirements for the sustained growth of the Brazilian economy  
  
In this section we will use simple version of the Harrod-Domar growth model
22 
23 in order to 
obtain an estimate of the warranted growth rate
24 of the Brazilian economy under the conditions 
imposed by the current economic policy. As we will see, the warranted growth rate under current 
economic conditions is no higher than 2.5 % per year. This growth rate is clearly unsatisfactory for an 
economy in which population growth rate is around 1.8% per year and productivity growth is estimated 
in 2.6% per year. This means that  warranted or equilibrium growth rate of the Brazilian economy is 
lower than the natural or potential long-run growth rate. This “disequilibrium” between warranted and 
natural growth rates of the Brazilian economy is the main cause of the high unemployment rate and of 
the decreasing of real average income observed recently in Brazil (Table 1).      
                                                 
20 See more in this connection in the next section. 
21 High banking spreads in Brazil is the result of three main factors: (i) as macroeconomic uncertainty has grown in recent 
years, the banks have sought – defensively – to  offset the greater perceived risk by increasing the banking spread, thus 
improving their net profit margins; (ii) as the banks have risk-free government securities as an alternative investment to 
private sector lending, they require very high returns to warrant offering loans, because of the increased opportunity costs of 
non-bearing reserves; and (iii) as the banking market has become increasingly concentrated, the available evidence indicates 
that the Brazilian banking market is structured non-competitively, which may be conducive to higher interest spreads. See 
more on this regard, Belaisch (2003) and Paula and Alves Jr (2003). 
22 We are using the Harrod-Domar growth model since (i) it is still the standard model used to predict the future path of real 
income by international institutions such as the World Bank (cf. Easterly, 2004, p.43) and (ii) recent developments of the 
so-called ‘New Growth Theory” – specially the development of AK growth models - had increased the academic confidence 
over the “predictions” of this type of model.     
23 The mathematical derivation of the Harrod´s growth model that we will present below will assume a closed economy 
without government activities. Although both external and governmental sectors are very important in the brazilian case, the 
necessary equality between investment and savings (governmental + external + private) in national accounts makes possible 
to substitute the “propensity to save” in the “closed economy-no government” model by the investment rate of the “open-
economy with government” model. By using investment rate instead of a “propensity to save” in the definition of the 
“warranted rate of growth”, we can work with a simple growth equation to analyze the brazilian case.     
24 We recognize that the concept of warranted rate of growth, as originally put by Harrod (1939), is different from the 
meaning that we are giving on this article. For Harrod, the “warranted rate of growth” is the growth rate of the capital stock 
(or real output) that, if obtained, will make entrepreneurs satisfied with the rate of increase of productive capacity, enabling 
then to continue on the same way. So the “warranted rate of growth” is not an equilibrium concept, but just a reference 
point: there is no mechanism by which the effective growth rate of capital stock will converge, in the long-run, to the 
“warranted growth rate”. On this article, we are not discussing the stability problems of the warranted rate of growth, that is, 
we are explicitly assuming that the “equilibrium” represented by the “warranted rate of growth” is a stable one.     11
  Let us start with an economy in which firms employ a Leontieff-type technology, being the 
stock of capital the limiting factor to firms’ production level (cf. Marglin, 1984, ch.5). In this setting, 





; ≡ = σ σ    (1) 
Where: v is the capital-output coefficient, that is the technical coefficient that shows the amount of 
“capital” that is necessary for the production of one unit of final output.. 
  Taking the time derivative of (1) we arrive at the following expression:  
   K Y & & σ = (1a) 
  Supposing a constant depreciation rate of the capital stock equal to &, the dynamics of capital 
stock is given by:  
  ) 2 ( &K I K − = &  
Where: I is the gross (planned) investment.   
  We will also suppose that households save a constant share s of share of their income. So, 
planned savings are given by:    
  ) 3 ( sY S =  
  One requirement for a sustained growth of the economy in the long-run is the equality between 
aggregate output and effective demand. For such is necessary that planned investment be equal to 
planned saving. Taking for grant the occurrence of this equality, we can substitute (3) in (2) in order to 
the following expression:    
  K sY K & − = &  (4) 
  After substitute (4) in (1a), we got:   
  ) & ( K sY Y − =σ &  (5) 
  Finally, after substitute (1) in (5) and dividing both sides of the resulting expression by Y, we 
arrive at the fundamental growth equation of the Harrod-Domar model given by: 







  (6) 
  Equation (6) determines the warranted growth rate; that is the growth rate of output that - if 
obtained – will assure the equality between effective demand and aggregate output over time.     
  In order to use equation (6) to estimate the warranted growth rate of the Brazilian economy we 
must have realistic values for the following parameters: capital-output coefficient, investment and 
saving rates and depreciation rate of the capital stock.  
  Estimates of the first two variables can be easily obtained at IPEADATA 
(www.ipeadata.gov.br). Capital-output coefficient shows a clear upward trend in the last fifty years as 
we can see in Figure 9. Such an upward trend makes difficult, if not impossible, the occurrence of a 
reduction in the capital-output coefficient in the near future. However, taking a simple average of the 
Capital-Output coefficient in the period 1989-2002 we will arrive at a value equal to 3.16, which can be 

























Investment rate, defined as gross capital formation divided by GDP, shows a remarkable 
stability in the period 1991-2003. This rate, according to IPEADATA, had fluctuated around 19.26% of 
GDP in this period as we can see in Figure 10. If there is no structural reforms in the financial sector 
that induce a higher rate of capital accumulation by the private sector and supposing the continuity of 
the current tight fiscal policy of the Brazilian government, which hampers public investment, there is 
no objective reason to believe that investment rate in the near-by future will be different from the 
average value of the period 1991-2003. So we can take 19.26% as a realistic estimate for the value of 














































































































































































































































Unfortunately, we have found no estimates about depreciation rate of the capital stock for the 
Brazilian economy. So we have no other option than use the values of this parameter for other 
economies. Romer (2001, p.25) estimates the depreciation rate of the capital stock for U.S. economy as 
lying between 3 and 4 % per year. So an average estimate for the depreciation rate of the capital stock 
for US economy is around 3.5% per year. Based on some similarities of the industrial sectors of Brazil 
and United States, we will use this value as an estimative for the depreciation rate of the capital stock 
of the Brazilian economy.     
 Taking  s  = 0.1926, v = 3.16 and &  = 0.035 in equation (6) we get g = 0.025, that is an 
equilibrium growth rate equal to 2.5% per year. For several reasons, this growth rate is completely 
unsatisfactory for Brazil. First of all, Brazil grew at an average rate of 7.0% per year in the period 
between 1930 and 1980.  Second, this rate is lower than the natural growth rate; that is the required 
growth rate for full employment of the labour force. Estimating a population growth of 1.8% per year
25 
and a productivity growth of 2.6% per year
26, output must grow at a minimum rate of 4.4% per year in 
order to employ the new workers and those who lost their jobs due to technological progress. An 
average growth rate lower than 4.4% per year implies that unemployment and/or ‘underemployment’; 
i.e. employment in the informal sector of the economy, will increase over time. Last, but not least, this 
growth rate is clearly insufficient for Brazilian economy to cath-up developed economies. Average 
growth rate of developed countries lies between 2.5 to 3% per year.  If Brazilian economy grows at an 
average rate of 2.5% per year, than income gap between Brazil and developed countries will be 
constant or will increase in the long-run.  
 



























                                                 
25 See Figure 11. 
26 See Table 3.    14
  In face of these arguments, we consider an average growth rate of 5% per year a desirable and 
realistic goal for the Brazilian economic policy
27. In order to achieve this goal, investment rate – 
according to equation (6) – must increase to 27% of GDP
28. In other words, investment rate must 
increase at almost 8 % of GDP.    
 
Table 3 – Productivity Growth in Brazil (1950-1997) 
Period 












                                            Source: Franco (1999, p.150).  
 
5. How to increase the investment rate? An agenda of reform for the Brazilian economy  
 
  As we have seen in the last section, average investment rate in the last fifteen years was 
insufficient to generate a robust growth for the Brazilian economy. This behaviour of investment rate 
was mainly due to the “economic policy model” adopted by Brazilian policy makers since the 
beginning of 1990´s. This economic model, as we have already discussed, was characterized by (i) high 
nominal and real interest rates in order to achieve price stability; (ii) growing liberalization of the 
capital account in order to integrate Brazil to international capital markets; (iii) overvaluation of 
domestic currency
29, and (iv) since 1999 an increasing primary fiscal surplus – generated mainly by the 
reduction of public investment – in order to stabilize public debt/GDP ratio.  
 This  economic policy model has only succeeded in achieving a low rate of inflation compared to 
the period of high inflation; that is before 1994. Indeed, since 1996 inflation rate in Brazil has been 
lower than 20% per year. However, public debt as a ratio to GDP increased from 30% in 1994 to 
almost 55% in 2004 and GDP grow at an average rate of 2.4% per year in the period 1995-2004. Price 
stability is, of course, an important goal of economic policy, but not the only one. A robust economic 
growth and stability of public debt/GDP ratio are also very important.   
  In order to achieve a higher investment rate, economic policy model must be changed. Nominal 
and real interest rates must be reduced for entrepreneurs increase private investment. Primary fiscal 
surplus must also be reduced. Brazil needs to increase public investment in infra-structure – mainly 
roads and electricity generation – to generate positive externalities for private investment. Nominal and 
                                                 
27 A growth rate higher than the estimated natural growth rate of the Brazilian economy for several years (one decade or so) 
is possible due to the existence of a high unemployment rate (more or less 10% of the labour force) and, more importantaly, 
due to the existence of a very big informal (and low producitivity) sector in Brazil.  
28 For the calculation of the required investment rate, solve equation (6) for s in order to get the following expression: 
&) ( + = g v s . Taking v = 3.17, g = 0.05, & = 0.035 we arrive at a required investment rate of 26.94%.   
29 Except in the brief period between June of 2002 to June of 2003 due to the exchange rate crisis of the final of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) administration.    15
real exchange rates must be kept at competitive levels in order to generate a sustained current account 
surplus which is required to reduce the amount of external debt and the level of external fragility of 
Brazilian economy.  
  The challenge is to make these changes compatible with (i) price stability, and (ii) stabilization 
or reduction in the level of public debt. Brazil spent almost 15 years fighting against very high inflation 
rates. The reduction in inflation rates obtained after the Real Plan was a very important achievement 
and must be maintained. Stabilization in the level of public debt is also important. We simply can not 
stand with public debt/GDP ratio higher than 50%. With a so higher public debt as a ratio to GDP 
almost all the efforts of the financial sector was devoted to finance public debt, thereby causing a 
reduction in the level of banking credit to finance private expenditures. As we saw in section 3, Brazil 
had a very low credit to GDP ratio. The main reason for this is that banks prefer to buy public bonds, 
which are very liquid and profitable, rather than to incur in the risks of lend money to private 
enterprises (Paula and Alves Jr, 2003).  
       An alternative economic policy model for the Brazilian economy
30 should be based on the 
following principles:  
1.  Adoption of a crawling-peg exchange rate regime in which devaluation rate of domestic currency was 
set by the Central Bank at a rate equal to the difference between a target inflation rate (determined by 
National Monetary Council – C.M.N) and average inflation rate of Brazil’s most important trade 
partners; that are United States, European Union, China, Japan and Argentina.  
2.  Adoption of market-based capital controls in order to increase the autonomy of the Central Bank to set 
nominal interest rates according to domestic objectives (mainly to promote a robust growth) and to 
avoid the likelihood of speculative attacks on the Brazilian currency.  
3.  Reduction of nominal interest rate to a level compatible with a real interest rate of 6.0% per year.  
4.  Reduction of primary fiscal surplus from current 4.5% of GDP to 3.0% of GDP on average for the 
period of 10 years. This reduction must be used to increase public investment in the same amount.  
 
The first principle of the “alternative economic policy model” entails the abandonment of the 
current  Inflation Targeting Regime (hereafter ITR). As we know, in the ITR, monetary policy is 
directed only to price stability. For the workings of this system, however, there must be a floating 
exchange rate regime. This exchange rate regime has not worked well in the Brazilian case. First of all, 
since the adoption of floating, in the beginning of 1999, there was a huge volatility in nominal 
exchange rate as we saw in section 3. This volatility increases exchange rate risk and the uncertainty 
surrounding investment decisions. Second, this system was not capable to avoid the problem of 
exchange-rate over-evaluation. For instance, nominal exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Brazilian 
currency (‘real’) felt from R$3.50 in June of 2003 to R$2.70 in January of 2005, an appreciation of 
almost 23% in 18 months. This huge appreciation in nominal exchange rate can soon reduce sharply 
current account superavits, thereby increasing the level of Brazilian external debt.    
Adoption of a crawling-peg exchange rate regime will reduce the exchange rate risk – 
contributing to the increase in the private investment – and will contribute for the maintenance of the 
nominal exchange rate at competitive levels, provided that the initial level of the nominal exchange rate 
- i.e. the level set in the first day of the new regime -  was not over-valued
31.   
                                                 
30 The ideas shown here were originally proposed by Oreiro et al (2003, ch 4).   
31 This was one of the problem with the crawling-peg exchange rate regime adopted in Brazil between 1995 and 1998. This 
system was adopted in march of 1995 as a response to the exchange rate volatility caused by Mexico Crisis. However, real 
exchange rate had accumulated an appreciation of almost 30% under the former floating regime from July of 1994 to 
January of 1995 (cf. Ferrari Filho et alli, 2003, p.189). The crawling-peg was introduced without the necessary correction of 
the real exchange rate appreciation and without an adequate structure of capital controls. The result was a cumulative   16
Another interesting feature of the crawling-peg exchange rate regime is that it will serve as 
nominal anchor for the Brazilian economy, substituting ITR as a device for inflation control. If 
Purchasing Power Parity theorem (thereafter PPP) holds true, than the (effective) domestic rate of 
inflation () π
32  is equal to exchange rate depreciation ( ) e ∆  plus international inflation rate ( )
* π . In the 
crawling-peg exchange rate regime, Central Bank sets the rate of depreciation of domestic currency, 
maintaining domestic rate inflation in a level near-by the one dictated by PPP. 
Accumulated experience during ITR shows that an implicit target inflation of 8.0% per year is a 
realistic goal for economic policy in Brazil. Supposing that international rate of inflation lies between 
1.5% to 2.0% per year, Central Bank will set the rate of domestic currency devaluation in 10% per year 
under the crawling-peg exchange rate regime. A competitive level for the initial value of nominal 
exchange rate under this new regime should be R$3.20
33.   
  The second principle of the ‘alternative economic policy model’ is the adoption of capital 
controls. These controls are necessary for two basic reasons. First of all, to increase private investment 
is necessary a substantial reduction in the level of domestic interest rates. In fact, in the last six years 
(1999-2004) real interest rates was up to 11% per year. This level of real interest rates is clearly 
harmful for private investment. So it has to be reduced. However, under the actual open capital account 
situation of the Brazilian economy, a sharp reduction in interest rates may cause a huge capital outflow, 
making impossible for the Central Bank to control the nominal exchange rate devaluation. To avoid 
this result is necessary the implementation of controls over capital outflows. The second reason is that 
control over nominal exchange rate may not be sufficient to avoid a substantial appreciation of real 
exchange rate in the presence of huge capital inflows. These flows will make the Central Bank to 
increase the stock of high powered money due to the buying of foreign reserves, which is necessary to 
sustain the nominal exchange rate at the level determined by monetary authorities. In absence of 
sterilization, this may produce an excessive increase in aggregate demand that can generate inflationary 
pressures in the economy and, given the rate of depreciation of nominal exchange rate, real exchange 
rate appreciation. 
We propose the adoption of market based capital controls, that is the introduction of income 
taxes over the yield of foreign investment in Brazilian assets
34. These taxes should be proportional to 
the length of investment in these assets. For example, a one-year investment in Brazilian assets should 
be taxed at a rate of 35% over all yields generated by these assets during this period. A two-year 
investment should be taxed at a much lower rate, for example, 28%. A three-year investment must be 
taxed at an even lower rate of 19%. The idea is to give to foreign investors a clear and strong incentive 
to make their investment in Brazilian assets as long as possible in order to create market incentives for 
the reduction of capital outflows.    
To reduce capital inflows, it is necessary the introduction of reserve requirements over all 
capital inflows, except foreign direct investment, as done by Chile in the beginning of 1990s. The idea 
                                                                                                                                                                        
increase in current account deficit which produced a speculative attack against domestic currency in the middle of 1998, just 
after the Russian crisis. The Brazilian Central Bank tried to defend the exchange rate regime for almost 6 months with the 
support of extremely high nominal interest rates, without success. After a lost of almost US$ 30 Billion of foreign reserves, 
the Central Bank adopted a floating regime in January of 1999.  See more on this regard in Paula and Alves Jr (2000). 
32 Effective inflation rate may be different from target inflation rate, which is set by National Monetary Council and was a 
reference for the nominal exchange rate devaluation, due to the occurrence of supply shocks.    
33 This implies that during the transition from the actual free floating exchange rate regime to the crawling-peg regime there 
must be a nominal exchange rate appreciation of almost 19%. This will generate a transitory increase in the rate of 
inflation due to pass-through effect of exchange rate to prices. To avoid a permanent increase in the rate of inflation, it is 
necessary that real wages were reduced in order to make possible a real exchange rate depreciation. This means that during 
the transition from the old to the new exchange rate regime, nominal and real interest rates must me kept at high levels to 
force unions to accept a reduction in real wage. Once the new exchange rate regime was implemented and inflation has 
returned to its prior level, interest rates can be reduced.  
34 This proposal was originally set by Paula et al (2003).     17
is to oblige foreign investors to make a deposit of a fixed percentage of the value of their investment in 
the Brazilian assets at the Central Bank. These deposits will receive a zero yield over all the investment 
period. This will reduce the ex-ante yield of these assets for foreign investors, creating market 
incentive for the reduction of capital inflows.  
After the implementation of the crawling-peg exchange rate regime and market-based capital 
controls, it will be possible to reduce the level of domestic interest rates with-out producing an increase 
in inflation rate and/or a huge capital outflow. The relevant question now is: how much reduction in the 
level of interest rates is possible in economic terms?  
In a regime of fully open capital account, the answer would be very simple: interest rates can be 
reduced to a level equal to the one dictated by uncovered interest rate parity
35; i.e. international interest 
rates plus the risk premium required for foreign investors to buy domestic assets plus the expected rate 
of depreciation of domestic currency.  
In the Brazilian case the relevant international interest rates were the interest rates over U.S. 
government bonds with the same maturity of the Brazilian government bonds
36. This rate is near-by 
4.0% per year. The risk premium over Brazilian sovereign bonds was near-by 450 basis points in the 
beginning of 2005.  Supposing the validity of PPP in the long-run, the expected rate of domestic 
currency depreciation must be equal to the difference between domestic and international rate of 
inflation. For a domestic rate of inflation of 8% and an international rate of inflation of 2%, the 
expected rate of currency depreciation should be equal to 6%. So, nominal interest rate in Brazil could 
be reduced from the current 18.25% per year to 14.5% per year with-out producing a huge capital 
outflow or an increase in inflation rate. This will imply a real interest rate of 6.5% per year.  
With capital controls, however, it will be possible a much higher reduction in the level of 
interest rates. So, it would be possible to reduce nominal interest rates to 12% per year, generating a 
real interest rate of 4% per year. However, the high level of public debt as a ratio to GDP may set a 
downward limit to the reduction in the level of nominal and real interest rates. It is true that Brazilian 
government bonds have a great degree of liquidity since secondary markets were these assets are traded 
- in Brazil or abroad - are well organized. This means that investors (both domestic and foreign) have a 
low required rate of return for investment is these assets. But Brazil is not United States or Germany. 
Investors still have doubts about the inter-temporal solvency of Brazilian government. In this case, a 
very low real interest rate may make impossible for Treasury to roll over the existing debt. Prudence 
dictates a certain degree of conservatism in the setting of nominal and real interest rate levels by the 
Central Bank.  
 This reasoning shows to us that a real interest rate of 6% per year, although still a high level, it 
is a perfectly realistic value for the Brazilian economy and should be the target of the monetary 
policy
37.   
  Once real interest rates were reduced to 6% per year, it will be possible to reduce the level of 
primary fiscal surplus. The required level of primary surplus is determined by government inter-
                                                 
35 For a critical vision about the validity of the interest parity theorems, see Lavoie (2000). We do not agree, however, with 
Lavoie´s assertion that “(…) even in an open economy with financial mobility, central banks retain the ability to set interest 
rates of their choice, within a wide spectrum” (p.163). As recognized by Lavoie few pages later, if the Central Bank tried to 
reduce the real interest rate, the consequence of this action in a fully liberalized capital account economy will be a capital 
outflow and, for those economies with floating exchange rate regimes, a nominal exchange rate depreciation (p.176). This 
will produce an increase in the rate of inflation due to the pass-through effect of exchange rate variations to prices. So 
capital controls are necessary to avoid capital outflows due to the reduction of domestic interest rates relative to the 
international level of those rates.      
36 The average maturity of Brazilian government bonds is near-by 30 months.  
37 Here we see another function of capital controls. In a fully open capital account regime, according to the Mundell-
Fleming model, it is impossible for the Central Bank to determine interest rates and the exchange rate in an independent 
way. The only alternative for those countries that want to have an autonomous monetary policy and fixed exchange rate 
regime is to adopt capital controls. See more, on this regard, Tobin (2000).   18
temporal solvency condition. This condition determines the minimum level of primary surplus that is 
compatible with a constant public debt to GDP ratio. This condition is given by the following 
equation
38:  














Where: s is the primary surplus as a ratio to GDP, r is the level of real interest rate, g is the 
growth rate of real GDP, and b is the ratio of public debt to GDP.  
Under the conditions imposed by the current economic policy model, we have r = 0.11; g = 
0.025; b = 0.53. So the minimum level of primary fiscal surplus must be 4.4% of GDP. However, a 
successful implementation of the alternative economic policy model may change the values of these 
parameters to: r = 0.06; g = 0.05; b = 0.53. In this case the minimum level of primary surplus can be 


















So the reduction of primary surplus from actual 4.5% of GDP to 3.0% of GDP is not only 
compatible with the inter-temporal solvency condition, but also with a cumulative reduction of public 
debt as a ratio to GDP. Under the conditions supposed by the alternative economic policy model, the 
public debt as a ratio to GDP will be reduced to 32% of GDP in 2012, as we can see in Figure 11
39.  
  The reduction of primary surplus is essential for the increase in public investment. We propose 
that the entire reduction in primary surplus is  used to increase public investment. In this case, public 
                                                 
38 See Oreiro (2004a) for a detailed discussion of this condition. A similar – although not identical – condition can be found 
in Palley (2004).  













, taking s = 0.03; r = 0.06; g 
= 0.05 and b(0) = 0.53.  
 
  
Figure 12 - Expected Dynamics of Public Debt as a Ratio to GDP in 
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investment will be increased by 1.5% of GDP. Supposing a one-to-one relation between public and 
total investment, the average rate of investment will be increased to 20.67% of GDP and potential 
growth rate will be increased to 3.04% per year.  
  However, there are good reasons to suppose that an increase in public investment will increase 
total investment (public plus private) at a rate greater than one to one. First of all, as recognized even 
by Neoclassical Growth Theorists such as Barro (1990), public investment generates positive 
externalities for the private sector. So an increase in public investment will increase profits in the 
private sector, stimulating entrepreneurs to increase their investment spending. Second, a reduction in 
the primary fiscal surplus will certainly increase aggregate demand due to the well-known government 
spending multiplier. In a regime of excess capacity as the one that characterized the Brazilian economy 
since the beginning of the 1980s, firms will increase output in order to meet the additional demand for 
their products. The increase in the production level will generate also an increase in the degree of 
capacity utilization, stimulating firms to increase their investment spending in order to make the 
adjustment between effective and desired degree of capacity utilization (cf. Oreiro, 2004b). In other 
words, the increase in the level of capacity utilization will produce an increase in private investment 
due to the well-know accelerator effect.   
  So we can assume that an increase in public investment will produce a higher than one-to-one 
increase in total investment. We do not have a precise estimate of this magnitude, but an ‘educated 
guess’ is that an increase in public investment will induce a 1.5 increase in total investment. Under 
these conditions, an increase in public investment by 1.5% of GDP will increase total investment by 
2.25% of GDP. This means that potential growth rate of real GDP will be increase up to 3.3% per year. 
This effect combined with the positive stimulus over private investment from the reduction in the level 
of real interest rates and from the elimination of uncertainty due to the exchange rate risk will generate 
the required increase in the investment rate for a sustained growth of the Brazilian economy at a rate of 




This paper presented a Keynesian strategy of economic policy that aims to achieve higher, 
stable and sustained economic growth in Brazil. The basic features of this strategy are: (i) adoption of a 
crawling-peg exchange rate regime in which devaluation rate of domestic currency was set by the 
Central Bank at a rate equal to the difference between a target inflation rate and average inflation rate 
of Brazil’s most important trade partners; (ii) adoption of market-based capital controls in order to 
increase the autonomy of the Central Bank to set nominal interest rates according to domestic 
objectives (mainly to promote a robust growth); (iii) reduction of nominal interest rate to a level 
compatible with a real interest rate of 6.0% per year; (iv) reduction of primary surplus from current 
4.5% of GDP to 3.0% of GDP. These elements are fundamental for the required increase in the 
investment rate of Brazilian economy from current 20% of GDP to 27% of GDP needed for a sustained 
growth of 5% per year. 
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